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An adequate supply of infrastructure services has long 
been viewed by both academics and policy makers as a 
key ingredient for economic development. Sub-Saharan 
Africa ranks consistently at the bottom of all developing 
regions in terms of infrastructure performance, and 
an increasing number of observers point to deficient 
infrastructure as a major obstacle for growth and 
poverty reduction across the region. This paper offers 
an empirical assessment of the impact of infrastructure 
development on growth and inequality, with a focus 
on Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper uses a comparative 
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effort in the department to understand the determinants of growth in Africa. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
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cross-regional perspective to place Africa’s experience 
in the international context. Drawing from an updated 
data set of infrastructure quantity and quality indicators 
covering more than 100 countries and spanning the 
years 1960-2005, the paper estimates empirical growth 
and inequality equations including a standard set of 
control variables augmented by infrastructure quantity 
and quality measures, and controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of the latter. The estimates illustrate the 
potential contribution of infrastructure development to 
growth and equity across Africa.  
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Decades of economic stagnation and declining living standards have turned Sub-
Saharan Africa into the world’s poorest region. In spite of an incipient recovery since the 
end of the 1990s, with per capita income growth rates outpacing those of rich countries 
for the first time in many years, leading observers in the development and policy 
community are advocating a ‘big push’ to help the region escape poverty and regain the 
lost ground vis-à-vis the rest of the developing world (e.g., Sachs et al 2004, Collier 
2006). These calls for action propose a variety of remedial policy agendas, but virtually 
all of them list infrastructure development among the top priorities. 
An adequate supply of infrastructure services has long been viewed as a key 
ingredient for economic development, both in the academic literature (starting with the 
work of Aschauer 1989) as well as in the policy debate (e.g., World Bank 1994). Over the 
last two decades, academic research has devoted considerable effort to theoretical and 
empirical analyses of the contribution of infrastructure development to growth and 
productivity. More recently, increasing attention has been paid also to the impact of 
infrastructure on poverty and inequality (Estache, Foster and Wodon 2002, World Bank 
2003, 2006). While the empirical literature on these two topics is far from unanimous, on 
the whole a consensus has emerged that, under the right conditions, infrastructure 
development can play a major role in promoting growth and equity – and, through both 
channels, helping reduce poverty. 
In most dimensions of infrastructure performance, Sub-Saharan Africa ranks at 
the bottom of all developing regions, so the strategic emphasis on infrastructure is hardly 
surprising. And the literature suggests that some intrinsic features of Africa’s economies 
may enhance the potential role of infrastructure for the region’s economic development – 
in particular, the large number of Africa’s landlocked countries, home to a major 
proportion (about 40 percent) of the region’s overall population, and the remoteness of 
most of the region’s economies from global market centers. These geographic 
disadvantages result in high transport costs that hamper intra and inter-regional trade, as 
variously shown by Limao and Venables (2001), Elbadawi, Mengistae and Zeufack 
(2006), and Behar and Manners (2008). Reduced openness to trade is the main factor 
  2behind the robust empirical finding that – other things equal – landlocked countries tend 
to grow more slowly than the rest. However, these geographic disadvantages do not pose 
an insurmountable obstacle to development -- they can be offset with good transport and 
communications facilities.
1  Africa’s problem is that poor infrastructure adds to its 
geographic disadvantage.  
Aside from external trade, there are many concrete indications that deficient 
infrastructure hampers Africa’s development in other ways.  Reinikka and Svensson 
(1999) use data from Uganda’s industrial enterprise survey to test the impact of poor 
infrastructure – as reflected by an inadequate supply of electricity – on firm-level 
investment, and find that unreliable electricity is a significant investment deterrent. Diao 
and Yanoma (2003) show that growth in the agricultural sector is constrained by high 
marketing costs, which largely reflect poor transport (as well as other infrastructure) 
facilities. Estache and Vagliasindi (2007) argue that an insufficient power generation 
capacity limits growth in Ghana. Lumbila (2005) finds that deficient infrastructure may 
hinder the growth impact of FDI in Africa.  
This paper offers an empirical assessment of the impact of infrastructure 
development on growth and inequality, with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper 
uses a comparative cross-regional perspective to place Africa’s experience in the 
international context. Drawing from an updated data set of infrastructure indicators 
covering 100 countries and spanning the years 1960-2005, we estimate empirical growth 
and inequality equations including a standard set of control variables augmented with 
infrastructure development indicators. The empirical approach extends previous literature 
in several dimensions: it encompasses different core infrastructure sectors, considers both 
the quantity and quality of infrastructure, and accounts for their potential endogeneity. 
We use the empirical estimates to illustrate the contribution of infrastructure development 
to growth and equity across Africa.  
The paper follows recent empirical studies of the contribution of infrastructure to 
the level and growth of aggregate output and productivity (Sánchez-Robles 1998; 
Canning 1999; Demetriades and Mamuneas 2000; Röller and Waverman 2001; Esfahani 
                                                 
1 In other words, geography is only part of the story. Limao and Venables (2001) conclude that poor 
infrastructure is responsible for a good portion of Africa’s record-high transport costs and its abnormally 
low intra-regional trade. 
  3and Ramirez 2003; Calderón and Servén 2003, 2008). It also adds to a still incipient, but 
rapidly expanding literature on the distributive impact of infrastructure provision and 
reform (Estache, Foster and Wodon 2002; Calderón and Chong 2004). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we offer a brief review 
of recent literature concerned with the effects of infrastructure development on growth 
and distribution, with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
strategy and the econometric issues that arise when attempting to identify the impact of 
infrastructure on growth and income distribution. It presents the empirical results and 
reports illustrative exercises highlighting their implications for Africa. Finally, section 4 
offers concluding comments.  
 
2.  Infrastructure and economic development 
 
There is abundant theoretical work on the contribution of infrastructure to output, 
productivity and welfare. Much of it is closely related to a literature concerned with the 
macroeconomic role of productive public expenditure. Arrow and Kurz (1970 were the 
first to provide a formal analysis of the effects of public capital on output and welfare 
under alternative financing schemes. In their framework, public capital enters as an input 
in the economy’s aggregate production function, in the context of a Ramsey model with 
long-run growth exogenously determined. The endogenous growth version of this basic 
setup was developed first by Barro (1990), who assumed that the government’s 
contribution to current production is driven by its flow of productive expenditure, and 
later extended by Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) to include both public and private 
capital stock accumulation.  
This analytical literature has grown enormously in the last fifteen years, exploring 
a multitude of variants of the basic model, such as alternative tax structures, considering 
simultaneously public capital and productive current spending flows, adding public 
capital services in the utility function, or allowing for public infrastructure congestion.
2 
In turn, empirical research on the impact of infrastructure took off relatively 
recently, following the seminal work of Aschauer (1989), but it has boomed over the last 
                                                 
2 See for example Turnovsky (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), Baier and Glomm (2001), and Ghosh 
and Roy (2004).  
  4two decades – literally hundreds of papers have been devoted to assess the effects of 
infrastructure on growth, productivity, poverty, and other development outcomes, using a 
variety of data and empirical methodologies.  Calderón and Servén (2008) offer a partial 
account of the literature on the growth and inequality effects of infrastructure; more 
comprehensive surveys include Estache (2006), Romp and de Haan (2007) and Straub 
(2007). 
The bulk of the empirical literature on the effects of infrastructure has focused on 
its long-run contribution to the level or growth rate of aggregate income or productivity. 
The starting point was Aschauer’s (1989) finding that the stock of public infrastructure 
capital is a significant determinant of aggregate TFP in the U.S. However, his estimate 
(based on time series data) of the marginal product of infrastructure capital -- as much as 
100% per year -- was implausibly high.  
The massive ensuing literature on the output impact of infrastructure has employed 
a variety of data, empirical methods and infrastructure measures. The most popular 
approaches include the estimation of an aggregate production function (or its dual, the cost 
function) and empirical growth regressions. Infrastructure is variously measured in terms of 
physical stocks, spending flows, or capital stocks constructed accumulating the latter.  
A majority of this literature finds a positive long-run effect of infrastructure on 
output, productivity, or their growth rate.  More specifically, this is the case with almost all of 
the studies using physical indicators of infrastructure stocks, but results are more mixed 
among the growth studies using measures of public capital stocks or infrastructure spending 
flows (Straub 2007).  
  Another strand of recent literature has examined the effects of infrastructure on 
income inequality. The rationale is that infrastructure provision may have a 
disproportionate effect on the income and welfare of the poor by raising the value of the 
assets they hold (such as land or human capital), or by lowering the transaction costs 
(e.g., transport and logistic costs) they incur to access the markets for their inputs and 
outputs. These effects may occur through a variety of mechanisms documented in the 
empirical literature; see for example Estache, Foster and Wodon, (2002), Estache (2003), 
and Calderón and Servén (2008).  Of course, for infrastructure development to reduce 
  5income inequality, the key ingredient is that it must help expand access by the poor, as 
argued for example by Estache et al. (2000).
3 
A related strand of the empirical literature focuses on the poverty effects of 
specific infrastructure projects using matching techniques that combine samples of 
beneficiaries with samples drawn from regular household surveys.
4  On the whole, the 
evidence shows that public investment in infrastructure —specifically, in the 
rehabilitation of rural roads— improves local community and market development. For 
example, rehabilitation of rural roads raises male agricultural wages and aggregate crop 
indices in poor villages of Bangladesh (Khandker et al. 2006). Likewise, in Vietnam the 
result is an increase in the availability of food, the completion rates of primary school and 
the wages of agricultural workers (Mu and van de Walle, 2007). In the same vein, other 
studies find that access to new and improved roads in rural areas enhances opportunities 
in non-agricultural activities in Peru (Escobal and Ponce, 2002) and in non-farm activities 
among women in Georgia (Lokshin and Yemtsov, 2005).
5 
Few empirical studies have tackled directly the inequality impact of infrastructure 
at the macroeconomic level. Among them are those of López (2004) and Calderón and 
Servén (2008), both of which use cross-country panel data. López uses telephone density 
to proxy for infrastructure, while Calderón and Servén employ synthetic indices of 
infrastructure quantity and quality. In both cases, the finding is that, other things equal, 
infrastructure development is associated with reduced income inequality. Combined with 
the finding that infrastructure also appears to raise growth, the implication is that, in the 
right conditions, infrastructure development can be a powerful tool for poverty reduction. 
  
 
                                                 
3 We should also note that there may be two-way causality in this relationship, that is, income inequality 
may prevent the access of poorer people to infrastructure services. For example, Estache, Manacorda and 
Valletti (2002) show that income inequality adversely affects access to internet, while Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1999) argue that more unequal societies devote less effort to the provision of public goods, 
including infrastructure.  
4 This line of research compares the beneficiaries of the infrastructure project under analysis and a control 
group, using propensity score matching methods to eliminate the bias arising from time-invariant 
unobservable community characteristics that might affect the project’s outcome. 
5 Note that in the Peruvian case, income expansion generated by the rehabilitation of rural roads is faster 
than consumption expansion in areas articulated product and factor markets through motorized roads. The 
excess income is saved since beneficiaries perceived improvements in rural roads as transitory given the 
record of road maintenance in the area (Escobal and Ponce, 2002). 
  62.1  Infrastructure and development in Africa 
 
  A strand of recent papers has focused on the development impact of infrastructure 
in Africa. Ndulu (2006) offers an overview of the big issues, and Ayogu (2007) surveys 
the empirical literature. Most of the latter deals with the growth and productivity effects 
of infrastructure development. For example, Estache, Speciale and Veredas (2005) 
present pooled OLS growth regressions based on an augmented Solow model including a 
variety of infrastructure indicators, one at a time. Their main conclusion is that roads, 
power and telecommunications infrastructure – but not water and sanitation -- contribute 
significantly to long-run growth in Africa. Other studies follow a production function 
approach. Ayogu (1999) applies it to regional panel data from Nigeria, finding a strong 
association between infrastructure and output. Kamara (2006) uses data from African 
countries to calculate various dynamic panel estimates of the effects of infrastructure in 
an aggregate production function augmented with indicators of the quality of 
macroeconomic policy.  Boopen (2006) likewise presents panel estimates of the output 
contribution of transport infrastructure using similar data. 
South Africa (along with Nigeria) has attracted special attention in this literature, 
partly reflecting the significantly better quality of its data relative to that of other 
countries in the region. Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) use a detailed database on 
infrastructure investment and capital stocks, spanning as long as a hundred years, to test 
for the existence of a long-run relation between different infrastructure measures and 
GDP. Their results suggest a bi-directional relation in most cases. Kularatne (2005) 
explores the effects of infrastructure investment (as well as social spending on health and 
education) on GDP. He also finds bi-directional effects, although the impact of 
infrastructure investment appears to occur indirectly through private investment. 
Dinkelman (2008) finds a significant impact of household electrification on employment 




Much of the literature reviewed above is subject to some major caveats. There are 
three main concerns: identification, measurement and heterogeneity.  We discuss them 
  7next, focusing on the case when the relation of interest is that between infrastructure and 
output or its growth rate – although similar concerns apply to the relation of infrastructure 
with other development outcomes.  
Consider first the issue of measurement. Infrastructure is a multi-dimensional 
concept, comprising services that range from transport to clean water. Yet many studies 
take a single indicator (most often telephone density) to proxy for “infrastructure”. 
Omitting other indicators of infrastructure where they are relevant – e.g., in growth 
empirics – is likely to lead to invalid inferences owing to omitted variable biases. No less 
problematic is the measurement of infrastructure through spending flows – typically 
public investment, or its accumulation via perpetual inventory into public capital -- used 
by much of the literature. Public investment and public capital are likely to be poor 
proxies for infrastructure accumulation if the private sector plays a significant role in 
infrastructure provision, as is increasingly the case in many countries. Moreover, even if 
all infrastructure were owned by the public sector, the link between observed public 
capital expenditure and the accumulation of infrastructure assets or the provision of 
infrastructure services may be weak, owing to inefficiencies in public procurement and 
outright corruption (Pritchett 2000). In fact, these factors are likely behind the generally 
mixed results obtained by empirical studies using these kinds of infrastructure measures.
6 
In turn, the issue of identification is perhaps the most problematic one. 
Infrastructure and output (or income) are subject to two-way causality. Richer or faster-
growing countries may systematically devote more resources to infrastructure, and 
empirical assessments of the impact of infrastructure that fail to take this into account are 
likely to be subject to an upward simultaneity bias. There is no easy solution to this 
problem. In theory, a full structural model would be able to account for two-way 
causation. In practice, its empirical implementation poses stringent data requirements. 
The closest the literature has come to such a model is perhaps in the use of stripped-down 
versions of Barro’s (1990) framework (e.g., Canning and Pedroni 2004). An alternative is 
to use some kind of instrumental variable approach, ideally featuring outside instruments 
                                                 
6 Straub (2007) offers a meta-analysis of the output or growth contribution of infrastructure. Less than half 
of the empirical studies using expenditure-based infrastructure measures find significant positive effects. In 
contrast, over three-fourths of the studies using physical indicators find a significant positive contribution 
of infrastructure.     
  8for infrastructure. For example, Calderón and Servén (2003, 2008) employ demographic 
variables as instruments -- alone or in combination with internal instruments -- in a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) panel framework. Roller and Waverman (2001) 
follow a similar approach.  
Note also that in a time-series context the issue of simultaneity is arguably more 
problematic for those studies using investment flows to measure infrastructure services 
than for those using physical asset stocks. Decision lags and time-to-build suggest that 
physical assets are likely to be predetermined variables relative to output or productivity, 
and this may help address identification issues. However, time series data also pose the 
problem of spurious correlation, which if untreated will result in upward-biased estimates 
of infrastructure effects on output, particularly in the production-function approach 
mentioned earlier. Output (or productivity) and infrastructure stocks typically display 
stochastic trends, and failing to account for them can lead to the spurious finding of a 
positive and significant association between both variables where in reality there is none.  
Indeed, this upward bias was largely responsible for Aschauer’s early findings of a very 
large impact of infrastructure on output using time series data. In a panel context, recent 
theoretical research shows that spurious regression is much less of an issue provided the 
cross-section dimension of the data is sufficiently large (Philips and Moon 1999). As for 
pure time-series models, recent studies often seek to avoid this problem by following 
cointegration methods to estimate a long-run relation between infrastructure, aggregate 
output or productivity, and other production inputs. This, however, is typically done in a 
single-equation context, and therefore it is subject to the same identification problems 
just discussed, unless the researcher can somehow establish the existence of a single 
long-run relation among these variables that can be interpreted as ‘the output equation’. 
  Finally, heterogeneity is a pervasive problem too. The contribution of 
infrastructure, as summarized by the standard measures described earlier, to output or its 
growth rate may well vary across countries and time periods, for various reasons. 
Physical infrastructure stocks, for example, are rarely homogeneous in terms of quality or 
productivity, which should be reflected in their output or growth impact; yet few 
empirical studies using physical stock data control for the quality of stocks – which is 
  9admittedly hard to do due to the scarcity of infrastructure quality data.
7 In this sense 
spending flows are again especially problematic, as their contribution to the supply of 
infrastructure assets or services can vary greatly across countries and over time 
depending on a host of factors ranging from geographic to institutional ones.  
Aside from these considerations, technological or other factors may make the 
impact of otherwise homogeneous infrastructure assets or services differ across locations 
or time periods. Few empirical studies allow for such heterogeneity, and when they do 
they typically restrict heterogeneity to tractable forms, with country (or state, province 
etc) specific effects as the most popular option. Conceptually, heterogeneity could be 
parameterized by relating it to observable variables – e.g., institutional or governance 
variables intermediating the translation of spending into assets. In theory, very general 
forms of parameter heterogeneity – e.g., across countries -- can be easily accommodated 
empirically, but in practice this demands time-series sample sizes that are often 
unavailable, as is the case for a number of African countries. A few recent studies (e.g., 
Bogetic and Fedderke 2006) employ a pooled mean-group approach that allows for 
unrestricted short-run heterogeneity in the impact of infrastructure, while imposing long-
run homogeneity of its effects across countries or industries.  
 
3. Empirical  assessment 
 
We turn to the empirical assessment of the contribution of infrastructure to growth 
and equity. Our empirical strategy involves estimation of simple equations relating 
growth and inequality to a set of standard controls, augmented by measures of the 
quantity and quality of infrastructure. For this purpose, we construct a large 
macroeconomic panel data set spanning the period 1960-2005 and comprising a total of 
136 countries (see Table A1 for the detailed list of countries, and Table A2 for the list of 
variables and data sources).  To avoid potential distortions introduced by very small 
                                                 
7 Neglecting quality may lead to seriously misleading inferences. Hulten (1996) finds that differences in the 
effective use of infrastructure resources explain one-quarter of the growth differential between Africa and 
East Asia, and more than 40 percent of the growth differential between low- and high-growth countries. 
Among the few studies that attempt to control for infrastructure quality, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) 
report significant growth effects of infrastructure in a large panel data set in which the contribution of 
infrastructure is affected by institutional factors. Calderón and Servén (2008) find significant growth effects 
of a synthetic indicator of infrastructure quality in an empirical framework including both quantity and 
quality effects. 
  10economies, in which infrastructure poses some special issues – owing for example to 
indivisibilities -- we limit our coverage to countries with total population over one 
million. Also, to remove cyclical factors and focus on longer-term effects, we work with 
non-overlapping 5-year averages. Data is not available for all countries in all time 
periods, and hence the panel is unbalanced. To keep a meaningful time-series dimension, 
we restrict our regression sample to countries with at least three consecutive 5-year 
observations. 
 
3.1   Methodological issues 
Our methodological approach allows us to address some of the problems 
commonly encountered in empirical evaluations of the development impact of 
infrastructure. The first one is measurement. In contrast with the abundant literature that 
measures infrastructure in terms of an investment flow or stock (“public capital”) or a 
single physical asset (such as telephone density), we consider different types of core 
infrastructure assets. Second, our estimation procedure deals with potential endogeneity 
and/or reverse causality running from growth and inequality to infrastructure 
development. Third, we also take account of heterogeneity along various dimensions. On 
the one hand, our estimations control not only for the quantity of infrastructure, but also 
for its quality. On the other hand, we allow for some degree of heterogeneity in the 
relationship between infrastructure and growth, by including unobservable country-
specific effects in our empirical specification. We also perform some robustness 
experiments letting the coefficients of the empirical equation vary with selected country 
characteristics. 
 
3.1.1 Measuring the quantity and quality of infrastructure 
While infrastructure is a multi-dimensional concept, empirical studies typically 
take a single-sector approach. For instance, Easterly (2001) and Loayza, Fajnzylber and 
Calderón (2005) use indicators of telephone density to appraise the effects of 
infrastructure on growth.  One reason behind the single-sector approach is the difficulty 
of properly capturing the multiple dimensions of infrastructure in a simple way. Another 
reason is the high correlation often found among indicators of different types of 
  11infrastructure assets. For example, in our sample the correlation between standard 
measures of telephone density and power generation capacity (measured respectively by 
a country’s total number of telephone lines, and its total power generation capacity, in 
both cases relative to the number of workers) exceeds 0.90, which makes it hard to 
disentangle in a regression framework the separate roles of the two types of assets.  
To overcome this problem, while still keeping account of the multi-
dimensionality of infrastructure, we use principal component analysis to build synthetic 
indices summarizing information on the quantity of different types of infrastructure assets 
as well as the quality of services in different infrastructure sectors.
8  These synthetic 
indices combine information on three core infrastructure sectors -- telecommunications, 
power, and roads -- and help address the problem of high collinearity among their 
individual indicators.
9 We denote the synthetic quantity and quality indices that result 
from this procedure IK and IQ, respectively. The indices can be expressed as linear 
combinations of the underlying sector-specific indicators, and hence their use in a 
regression context is equivalent to imposing linear restrictions on the coefficients of the 
individual infrastructure indicators.  These restrictions can be tested using standard Wald 
tests, as we shall do below.  
Proceeding in this manner, we define the synthetic infrastructure quantity index 
IK1 as the first principal component of three variables: total telephone lines (fixed and 
mobile) per 1000 workers (Z1/L), electric power generating capacity expressed in MW 
per 1000 workers (Z2/L), and the length of the road network in km. per sq. km. of arable 
land (Z3/A). Each of these variables is expressed in logs and standardized by subtracting 
its mean and dividing by its standard deviation. All three infrastructure stocks enter the 

























1 ln * 510 . 0 ln * 613 . 0 ln * 603 . 0  
                                                 
8 Alesina and Perotti (1996) used principal component analysis to create a measure of political instability, 
while Sanchez-Robles (1998) employed it to build an aggregate index of infrastructure stocks. 
9 We should caution that the sector-specific indicators of infrastructure quantity and quality employed 
below, while standard in the literature, are subject to caveats regarding their homogeneity and international 
comparability. For example, the quality and condition of a ‘paved road’ can vary substantially across 
countries – even within the same country. More homogeneous measures of infrastructure performance 
would be clearly preferable, but unfortunately they do not exist, at least with any significant coverage 
across countries and time periods. 
  12The index accounts for almost 80 percent of the overall variance of the three underlying 
indicators and, as Table 1 shows, it is also highly correlated with each one of them. 
As a robustness check, we compute an alternative index of infrastructure quantity, 
IK2, which uses main telephone lines instead of the combined main lines and mobile 
phones employed in the first index; this is in accordance with much of the empirical 
literature, which uses main lines to measure telephone density.  However, the correlation 
between the two synthetic quantity indices is over 0.99 (see Table 2); this is unsurprising 
given the similarly high correlation between the two indicators of telephone density 
underlying the respective synthetic indicators.  
Measuring infrastructure quality is less straightforward. The country and/or time-
series coverage of some of the objective quality indicators that should be most 
informative (such as the frequency of power outages or phone faults) is severely limited. 
In turn, some subjective indicators of perceived infrastructure quality offer broad cross-
country coverage, but lack a time-series dimension (see Calderón and Servén 2008). We 
opt for using the available objective indicators that allow broadest sample coverage. 
Specifically, we construct a synthetic index of infrastructure quality IQ, defined as the 
first principal component of three indictors of quality of service in telecommunications, 
electricity and roads, respectively. The indicators are: waiting time (in years) for the 
installation of main telephone lines (Q1), the percentage of transmission and distribution 
losses in the production of electricity (Q2) and the share of paved roads in total roads 
(Q3). The first of these three variables is admittedly not a direct indicator of the quality of 
telecommunications networks, but is robustly positively correlated with the conceptually 
preferable measure (the number of telephone faults per 100 main lines) whose availability 
is severely limited in our sample; see Calderón and Servén (2008). All three variables are 
rescaled to lie between zero and one in such a way that higher values indicate better 
quality of infrastructure services.  
Using the weights obtained from the principal components procedure, the 
synthetic index of infrastructure quality can be expressed as: 
3 2 1 * 564 . 0 * 559 . 0 * 608 . 0 Q Q Q IQ + + =  
The index captures approximately 60 percent of the total variation of the three underlying 
indicators, and shows a high correlation with each of them, as reported in Table 1.  
  13Like with the quantity index, as a robustness check we compute an alternative 
index of infrastructure quality, IQ2. We do so by dropping from the list of variables the 
indicator of waiting time (in years) for the installation of main telephone lines (Q1) –
which is related to quality of service only indirectly. As shown in Table 1, the remaining 
two variables carry approximately equal weights in the synthetic index that result from 
this procedure. Moreover, the correlation between the two synthetic quality indices 
(shown in Table 2) exceeds 0.93. 
Table 2 also shows that the indicators of quantity and quality of infrastructure 
share a good deal of common information —i.e., the full-sample correlation between IK 
and IQ ranges from 0.63 to 0.73, depending on the specific indices considered. Closer 
inspection reveals that the same applies to individual infrastructure sectors: the respective 
stocks and their quality measures are also positively correlated —i.e. 0.59 for 
telecommunication, 0.46 for electricity, and 0.54 for roads. 
The synthetic indices can be used to provide a summary perspective on Africa’s 
infrastructure performance vis-à-vis other world regions and developing country groups. 
This is done in Figure 1. The choice of comparator groups in the figure deserves some 
comment. Given the preponderance of low-income countries across Africa, the best 
comparator region is probably South Asia, which is likewise dominated by low-income 
economies. For the same reason, we use as another comparator the group of non-African 
low-income economies. For illustration, the figure also shows the infrastructure 
performance of the East Asian tigers (which could be appropriate comparators for 
Africa’s upper middle income economies), along with that of industrial countries. The top 
panel of the figure offers a comparative perspective on infrastructure quantity, using the 
synthetic quantity index IK1, while the bottom panel refers to quality as measured by IQ1 
(the alternative indices IK2 and IQ2 give a very similar picture). In both cases, the graphs 
depict the situation in the early 1990s as well as that in the early 2000s.
10 The 
performance of each region is measured relative to the overall sample mean (equal to 
zero by construction).  
                                                 
10 The qualitative conclusions are be unchanged if we instead compare the early 1980s with the most recent 
period. The country samples are smaller, however. 
  14The figure conveys three messages. First, Sub-Saharan Africa consistently lags 
behind the comparator regions, in terms of both quantity and quality of infrastructure. 
Second, over the last fifteen years progress in Africa has been slower than in other 
developing regions, and as a result Africa has fallen further behind in both dimensions. 
Third, in the case of infrastructure quality, the region’s performance has worsened also in 
absolute terms, not just relative to that of other regions. 
Of course, these cross-regional comparisons conceal a great deal of heterogeneity 
within Africa in terms of infrastructure performance. A closer look at the country-specific 
data reveals a sharp contrast between the performance of some low-income economies 
(such as Niger or Togo), which lag well behind the rest of low-income developing 
countries, and that of the region’s richer economies (South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius), 
which are roughly on par with countries of similar income levels in other developing 
regions. The appendix documents these differences across sub-regions of Africa, and 
offers extensive details on various dimensions of infrastructure performance, including 
that of universality of access to infrastructure services– an area in which Africa also lags 




Our empirical strategy is based on estimation of simple equations relating growth 
and inequality to a set of standard controls, augmented by the synthetic measures of the 
quantity and quality of infrastructure, in a panel data setting. This poses some well-
known problems: (a) the presence of unobserved country-specific effects and common 
time effects, and (b) potential endogeneity of the regressors. To address these issues, we 
employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) for dynamic panel data models. Specifically, we 
deal with common factors through the inclusion of period-specific dummies, and 
unobserved country effects are handled by differencing. To control for endogeneity we 
rely on instrumental variables.  
This approach permits relaxing the assumption of strong exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables by allowing them to be correlated with current and previous 
                                                 
11 This section draws from Calderón and Servén (2008). 
  15realizations of the time-varying error term. In this context, we use a mixture of internal 
instruments in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991) -- that is, suitable lags of the 
explanatory variables – along with external instruments for our variables of interest, 
infrastructure quantity and quality, The reason for this two-track approach is double. 
First, infrastructure might not be weakly exogenous – e.g., anticipated future productivity 
shocks might encourage infrastructure investment today. This would make lags of the 
infrastructure indicators —both quality and quantity – invalid as instruments. Second, our 
infrastructure indicators might contain measurement error, particularly in the case of 
infrastructure quality, as discussed earlier. To address these problems, we employ 
demographic variables as outside instruments. Specifically, we use current and lagged 
values of urban population and population density of each country as instruments for the 
quantity and quality of infrastructure. The role of these and other demographic variables 
as determinants of infrastructure demand has been stressed by a number of studies; see 
e.g. Canning (1999). Further, while demographic factors drive the demand for 
infrastructure (in terms of both quantity and quality), there is no reason to expect them to 
exhibit any systematic relation with measurement errors in the latter. 
 Of course, for the demographic variables to provide valid instruments, they must 
also not belong in the growth regression —i.e., they must satisfy the exclusion 
restrictions. In light of existing literature, we see this requirement as fairly 
uncontroversial.  Although some analytical arguments can be found in the literature for a 
role of population density as a determinant of long-run growth, the potential growth 
effect that they highlight is mediated by other variables already included in our empirical 
specifications. For example, Herbst (2000) argues that Africa’s land abundance may have 
helped reduce inter-country conflict by lowering population density, thus contributing to 
forge stronger national institutions and thereby facilitating economic development in the 
longer term. We view this as an argument (additional to others made in the literature) for 
a growth role of institutional quality, which we include in our regressions as a standard 
control. On a different tack, from a very long run perspective, it has also been argued that 
low population density may retard technological innovation and thereby economic 
development (Klasen and Nestmann.2006). While some indirect effect of this kind may 
well be possible, the literature on innovation and technological upgrading points instead 
  16to factors such as education and competition as the more direct drivers of innovation. To 
account for the latter, in our empirical growth specifications we include measures of 
openness and human capital among the standard controls.
12 
We rely on the system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995), which 
combines the equation of interest expressed in first differences – using lagged levels of 
the regressors as internal instruments – and in levels – using lagged differences as 
instruments. Consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the internal 
and external instruments, which can be checked through two specification tests (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995): (i) Tests of over-identifying restrictions 
(Hansen and difference-Sargan tests) that evaluate the validity of the full set of 
instruments, as well as selected subsets, by testing the null hypothesis that they are 
uncorrelated with the estimated residuals. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives 
support to the model. (ii) Tests of serial correlation of the residuals – specifically, of the 
null hypothesis that the residual of the regression in differences shows no second-order 
serial correlation (first-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected 
even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a 
random walk).  Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual would indicate 
that the original error term is itself serially correlated. This would render the proposed 
internal instruments invalid (and would call for higher-order lags to be used as 
instruments). Again, failure to reject the null lends support to the model. 
  The standard errors of the efficient two-step GMM estimator are significantly 
downward biased in small samples. The bias arises from the fact that the approximation 
to the asymptotic standard errors does not take into account the extra small-sample 
variation due to the use of estimated parameters in constructing the efficient weighting 
matrix. Windmeijer (2005) proposes a correction that accounts for this fact. The 
correction term vanishes with increasing sample size and provides a more accurate 
                                                 
12 The exclusion restrictions underlying our choice of external instruments also accord with existing 
empirical growth literature.  For example, neither the rural/urban population composition nor population 
density appear among the “candidate” regressors in Levine and Renelt (1992), or in the broader set of 
potential explanatory factors examined by Fernández et al (2001). Further, in the mammoth list of 147 
regressors in Durlauf at el (2005) that summarizes the specifications used by several hundred empirical 
growth papers, no study is listed using the urban/rural composition of population as a growth determinant, 
while population density appears as a regressor in only one study (which finds its effect insignificant 
anyway).  
  17approximation in finite samples when all moment conditions are linear. Thus, in our 




3.2  Growth, infrastructure stocks and the quality of infrastructure services 
As a preliminary step, the top half of Table 2 shows that the aggregate indices of 
infrastructure quantity and quality are strongly and positively associated with long-run 
growth. Specifically, we find a positive correlation (0.34) between average annual growth 
in real GDP per capita over 1960-2005 and the average of each of the two synthetic 
indices of infrastructure quantity over the same period. We find an even stronger positive 
correlation between average growth per capita and the synthetic indices of aggregate 
quality of infrastructure services (0.42 for IQ1 and 0.35 for IQ2). Across infrastructure 
sectors (not shown in the table), growth is positively correlated with telecommunication 
stocks (0.24 for total phone lines, and 0.21 for main phone lines), electricity generating 
capacity (0.15) and the length of the road network (0.22). In addition, growth is positively 
associated with the quality of telecommunications (0.23), quality of electricity supply 
(0.14) and road quality (0.23).  
Table 3 reports the GMM estimates of the parameters of the growth regression 
augmented by the synthetic indices of infrastructure performance. As already noted, the 
two alternative indices of infrastructure quantity, as well as those of quality, are very 
highly correlated, and hence to save space we only report results using IK1 and IQ1. The 
set of standard control variables included in the regressions comprises measures of 
human capital (secondary enrollment, from Barro and Lee 2001), financial depth (from 
                                                 
13 The number of instruments is also a potential concern. The GMM estimators described in the text are 
designed for panels with a small time dimension T. The number of available internal instruments grows 
with the square of T (Windmeijer 2005; Roodman 2007). Using too many instruments in finite samples 
causes several problems in GMM-system estimators. First, a large set of instruments tends to over-fit the 
endogenous variables, thus failing to remove their endogenous component and yielding biased coefficient 
estimates. Second, the estimated variance matrix of the moments may not be accurately estimated, 
especially in finite samples. Usually, the number of elements in the estimated matrix is quadratic in the 
number of instruments —which, as noted, is itself quadratic in T. Even for modest sizes of T this tends to 
reduce the power of the Hansen/Sargan tests for joint validity of the instruments (as well as the difference-
Sargan tests for subsets of instruments), thus leading to Type I errors —that is, accepting the null of 
validity of instruments when it is not true.  Following Roodman (2007), we tested the robustness of the 
estimates and the specification tests to reductions in the instrument count. Overall, the results were 
supportive of the empirical model. These experiments are not reported here to save space, but are available 
form the authors. 
  18Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2000), trade openness, institutional quality, lack of 
price stability, government burden and terms of trade shocks – in addition to the lagged 
level of output per worker, to capture conditional convergence. The standard errors 
reflect Windmeijer’s (2005) small-sample correction. 
Column 1 of Table 3 reports parameter estimates including only the synthetic 
quantity indicator IK1in the regression, and thus neglecting infrastructure quality. Among 
the standard controls, the estimates show evidence of conditional convergence in real 
output per capita. They also suggest that human capital accumulation and lower inflation 
significantly encourage economic growth. The coefficients of the remaining controls 
carry the expected signs, but none is statistically significant.  
In turn, the infrastructure quantity index carries a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that infrastructure contributes to economic growth. Further, the 
specification tests shown at the bottom of the table (Hansen and difference-Sargan tests, 
as well as the second-order serial correlation test) show little evidence against the validity 
of the moment conditions underlying the empirical specification.  
Column 2 adds to the regression the synthetic indicator of infrastructure quality. It 
also carries a positive and strongly significant coefficient. The estimated coefficient of 
the quantity indicator declines somewhat in size, but remains positive and significant as 
well. Thus, both infrastructure quantity and quality contribute to growth. On the whole, 
there is a gain in precision, and in addition to the significant regressors in column 1, two 
other standard control variables – government burden and terms of trade shocks – now 
carry significant coefficients, whose signs are in accordance with expectations. The 
specification tests continue to lend support to the model specification.  
Column 3 reports the result of adding to the specification the squared values of 
the infrastructure quantity and quality indices, thus allowing for a quadratic effect of 
infrastructure development on growth. This provides a simple test for non-constant 
returns to infrastructure development. However, the estimates offer little evidence of 
nonlinearities, neither individually nor jointly – a Wald test of the joint significance of 
the two quadratic terms in column 3 yields a p-value of 0.98 -- while the linear effects of 
infrastructure quantity and quality remain virtually unchanged and strongly significant. 
  19The coefficients of the standard controls also show little change, as do the specification 
tests.  
One potential concern with the estimates in columns 1-3 is that they implicitly 
assume that the effect of infrastructure development on growth is homogeneous across 
countries. If in reality the effect is heterogeneous, the estimates would be inconsistent. 
More specifically, a number of recent papers (e.g., Sachs et al 2004, Collier 2006) have 
argued that infrastructure development is likely to have a bigger growth impact in 
African countries. In column 4 we test this view by interacting the aggregate indices of 
infrastructure quantity and quality with a dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries, and 
adding them to the regression. The estimates of these Africa-specific effects, over and 
above the average effects, are positive – in line with the literature mentioned above – but 
very imprecise. Indeed, a Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly 
insignificant (the p-value equals 0.40).  
We performed other tests of heterogeneity by interacting the infrastructure 
indicators with a dummy for landlocked countries (which are numerous in Africa) and, 
alternatively, doing the same only with the road density and quality measures. These tests 
failed to yield significant evidence that the growth impact of infrastructure development 
is different for landlocked countries.
14 
As a robustness check, we repeated all the estimations in Table 3 replacing the 
synthetic indices IK1 and IQ1 with the alternative indices IK2 and IQ2. The results (not 
shown to save space) were virtually unchanged, which is unsurprising in view of the high 
correlation between the two sets of indices. 
The final robustness check concerns the use of synthetic infrastructure indices in 
the regressions, rather than the underlying sector-specific variables. As noted earlier, this 
is equivalent to a regression imposing linear restrictions on the parameters of the latter, 
forcing them to enter in the empirical equation in the proportions dictated by the principal 
components. Specifically, use of the synthetic quantity index amounts to imposing two 
linear restrictions on the three underlying sector-wise quantity measures, while use of the 
quality index likewise amounts to placing two restrictions on the three underlying sector-
wise quality measures. These restrictions can be tested through standard Wald tests. 
                                                 
14 These results are not reported here but they are available from the authors. 
  20Taking this approach with the specification including (linear) effects of both quantity and 
quality of infrastructure, reported in column 2, yields a p-value of .57 when all four 
restrictions are jointly tested.
15 This implies that the use of the synthetic indices of 
infrastructure quantity and quality does not due undue violence to the data and hence 
lends support to our approach.  
  We can employ these results to give an idea of the economic significance of the 
effects of infrastructure development on growth. Using the estimates in the second 
column of Table 3, we calculate the contribution of infrastructure development —as 
proxied by the aggregate indices of infrastructure quantity and quality, IK1 and IQ1 — to 
growth over the last 15 years of the sample. That is, for each country in the sample we 
compare the average values of IK1 and IQ1 over 2001-5 with those observed in 1991-5, 
and multiply the observed change by the corresponding regression coefficient. This 
calculation is illustrative rather than conclusive, because -- among other simplifying 
assumptions – it is based on the implicit hypothesis that changes in infrastructure 
development do not lead to changes in any of the other growth determinants.  
The calculation shows that, on average, growth in the world sample increased by 
1.6 percent in 2001-5 relative to 1991-5 due to infrastructure development (see Figure 2). 
This total comprises 1.1 percent due to accumulation of infrastructure stocks, and 0.5 
percent due to improved infrastructure quality. The largest contribution of infrastructure 
development to growth was achieved in South Asia, where it reached 2.7 percent per 
annum. Of this total, enlarged stocks increased growth by 1.6 percent per year, and 
enhanced infrastructure quality raised growth rates by 1.1 percent per year in 2001-5 
relative to 1991-5. Finally, infrastructure development made, on average, a smaller 
contribution to growth in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions – just 0.7 percent per 
annum. While the expansion in infrastructure stocks raised the growth rate by 1.2 percent 
per annum, the deterioration of the quality of infrastructure services in the region 
contributed to reduce the growth rate by 0.5 percent per annum.  
 
 
                                                 
15 We can also test the restrictions imposed on the quantity and quality indicators separately (two 
restrictions in each case). This yields p-values of 0.27 in the case of quantity, and 0.80 for quality, likewise 
failing to reject either set of restrictions. 
  213.3  Infrastructure and income distribution 
We turn to the regressions exploring the empirical relationship between 
infrastructure development and income inequality. Our dependent variable is the Gini 
coefficient, for which the main source is the database constructed by Deininger and 
Squire (1996) complemented by the WIDER-UNU database on income inequality and 
poverty.  The selection of explanatory variables follows the existing empirical literature 
on the determinants of income inequality (Li, Squire and Zou, 1998; Milanovic, 2000; 
Lundberg and Squire, 2003). Among the regressors we include the (log) level of GDP per 
capita and its square, to allow for nonlinear effects in the spirit of the conventional 
Kuznets curve.
16 In addition, we continue to include our education proxy, the measure of 
financial depth, macroeconomic instability (proxied by the CPI inflation rate), and trade 
openness. As before, infrastructure quantity and quality are measured by the synthetic 
indices IK1 and IQ1 derived from principal components analysis described earlier. 
As a preliminary step, Table 2 shows that across countries the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality is strongly negatively correlated with the synthetic indices of 
infrastructure quantity and quality: their correlations with inequality range from -.47 to -
.56.
17 The literature on the linkages between infrastructure and income distribution 
argues that infrastructure development can reduce inequality if it enhances the access of 
the poor to telecommunication services, electricity, roads and railways, safe water and 
sanitation.
18 The first column in the bottom half of Table 2 confirms this view: across 
countries,
19 the percentage of population with access to the services of each of these 
infrastructure sectors is negatively associated with the degree of income inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient of income distribution. For our purposes, one key 
question is to what extent the synthetic indices of infrastructure quantity and quality 
                                                 
16 The same specification is used by Milanovic (2000) and Gradstein, Milanovic and Ying (2001). 
17 This negative association also holds across individual infrastructure sectors. The Gini coefficient is 
negatively correlated with the quantity of infrastructure in telecommunications (-0.44), power (-0.47), and 
 related 
, power (-0.37) and transportation (-0.62). 
n in 
roads (-0.53). Regarding the quality of infrastructure services, the Gini coefficient is also negatively
to quality in telecommunications (-0.34)
18 The appendix offers a cross-regional comparative perspective on standard indicators of access to 
electricity, roads, water and sanitation. 
19 Unfortunately, there is too little time-series data on access to infrastructure to examine the correlatio
the time dimension. Instead, we use cross-section data for the period 2001-5. 
  22capture trends in access.
20 To assess this issue, we correlate the access figures
synthetic indices of infrastructure quantity and quality. The bottom half of Table 2 show
that access to the various infrastructure services is positively and very significantly 
associated with the synthetic indices of infrastructure quantity and quality. The on
exception is the correlation between electricity access and infrastructure quality, which is 
positive but not significant.  On the whole, therefore, these facts suggest that the 
empirical results below regarding the income distribution impact of infrastructure 
development (as measured by the synthetic quantity and quality indices) do capture the 
distributional effects of changes in a
 with the 
s 
ly 
ccess to infrastructure services. 
Estimation results from the inequality regressions are presented in Table 4. 
Sample size is somewhat smaller than in the previous table because of the more limited 
availability of income distribution data. As before, column 1 reports estimations 
excluding infrastructure quality.  Among the standard controls, we note first that the sign 
pattern of the level and square of output per capita conforms to the ‘Kuznets curve’ 
hypothesis – i.e., the linear term is positive and the quadratic term is negative. Second, 
education is negatively associated with income inequality. Finally, trade openness – as 
proxied by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP – tends to make the distribution of 
income more unequal, as found by Barro (2000).  
  The infrastructure quantity index IK1 has a significant negative effect on 
inequality in column 1. This is consistent with the view that infrastructure development 
enhances the ability of poor individuals and/or residents of backward areas to access 
additional productive opportunities.  The diagnostic tests (Hansen and difference-Sargan 
tests of joint validity of instruments, and the second-order serial correlation test) lend 
support to the specification of the model and the choice of instruments. 
  Column 2 adds the infrastructure quality indicator IQ1. Its coefficient is negative 
and significant, while that of the quantity indicator declines roughly by half but remains 
negative and significantly different from zero. Among the other regressors, the quadratic 
                                                 
20 We should note that access is not distributed evenly across the population. Households in the upper 
percentiles of the income distribution typically enjoy much better access than poorer households do (World 
Bank 2006), and Africa is no exception to this rule (Diallo and Wodon 2004; Estache 2005). Nevertheless, 
















                                                
 term becomes insignificant. The rest of the coefficients do not show major 
changes, nor do the specification tests. 
As with the growth regressions, in column 3 of Table 4 we allow for nonlinear 
effects of infrastructure development on inequality. As the table shows, there is very
evidence of non-linearities in the effects of infrastructure quantity or quality. A Wa
cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero (p-value = 0.21). In turn, 
column 4 looks for a differential effect of infrastructure quantity and/or quality on 
inequality in Africa vis-à-vis other regions. As in the case of income growth, we fail to 
ch evidence of any such difference, and a Wald test fails to reject the null that 
Sub-Saharan Africa behaves just like the rest of the sample in this regard (p-value = 24). 
All these empirical exercises make use of the synthetic indices IK1 and IQ1. A
robustness check, we repeated the estimations using the alternative indices IK2 and IQ
The results (not shown to save space) were virtu
on of a negative quadratic effect of infrastructure quantity IK2 on inequality, 
which fell just short of statistical significance.  
Finally, we can follow the same procedure as with the growth regressions to 
assess the validity of the parameter restrictions implicitly imposed by the use of the 
synthetic indicators of quantity and quality rather than the individual sectors’ ind
A  test of these restrictions, as implicitly embedded in column 2 of Table 4, yields a 
p-value of 0.30, thus lending support to the use of the principal components.
21   
  To illustrate the economic significance of the empirical results, we focus again o
the regression results in the second column of table 4. Consider first the contribution 
infrastructure development to changes in income inequality over the last 15 years.  As 
before, we compare the levels of infrastructure development over 2001-5 with those 
over1991-5 for the average country in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as for that of other 
regions across the world. Using the coefficient estimates, Figure 3 shows that avera
inequality –as proxied by the Gini coefficient– in the world declined by 3 basis points i
2001-5 relative to 1991-5 due to infrastructure development (2 basis points due to 
accumulation of infrastructure stocks and 1 basis point due to improved infrastructur
 
21 Again, we can also test separately the restrictions imposed on the quantity and quality indicators. This 
procedure yields p-values of 0.33 in the case of quantity and 0.20 for quality, thus failing to reject either set 
of restrictions. 
  24quality). Like in the case of growth, the largest contribution of infrastructure deve
to inequality reduction was achieved by South Asia (6 basis points) where enlarged 
stocks yielded a reduction in the Gini coefficient by 4 basis points and enhanced 
infrastructure quality added another 2 basis points. Infrastructure development in Sub-
Saharan Africa made –on average– a comparatively smaller contribution to inequality 
reduction –approximately 2 basis points. While lar
lopment 
ger infrastructure stocks reduced the 








ample (Botswana, Gabon and South Africa), we use the average 
of 23 c  
e to 
astructure development are Pakistan (quantity) 
and Ind  
                                                
G
region raised the Gini coefficient by 1 
3.4 Counterfactual  exercises 
We can also use our econometric estimates to illustrate the growth consequences of 
alternative infrastructure development scenarios. To do this, we calculate the growth 
increase that each country in Sub-Saharan Africa would experience in tw
os of infrastructure development. The first one involves catching up with countrie
in other regions. The second scenario is one of ‘keeping up’ with them. 
Because our regression sample includes African countries of different per capita 
income levels-- 30 low-income countries and 3 upper-middle income countries
22 – we
use different benchmarks for each of these two income groups. For the low-income
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, we use as benchmark the average of 12 low-income 
countries from other regions for which we have data. For the upper-middle incom
African countries in our s
ountries from other regions in the same income category. The details of the two
scenarios are as follows. 
Scenario A: in 2001-2005, we raise the level of infrastructure development of 
each Sub-Saharan African country so as to reduce in half its infrastructure gap relativ
the average country in other regions in the relevant per-capita income group. To give a 
more concrete idea of the benchmarks considered, the low-income countries outside 
Africa closest to the average level of infr
ia (quality). In turn, the average for upper-middle income countries is given by
Chile (quantity) and Hungary (quality).  
 
22 The regression sample does not include any lower-middle income Sub-Saharan African countries. 
  25Scenario B: over the period 1991-1995 to 2001-2005, we make infrastructure 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries grow at the same average pace observed 
in the group of countries of comparable per-capita income in other regions – thus leaving 
Africa’s (relative) infrastructure gap unchanged at its 1991-95 level. Among low-income 








oup that we label Central Africa.






coming from the larger infrastructure stocks in all three cases.  Finally the growth 
                                                
y and quality) outside Africa. Among upper-middle-income economies, the rough 
benchmark is Brazil in infrastructure quantity and Malaysia in infrastructure quality.  
It is important to stress that these counterfactual scenarios involve no presump
about the desirability, on welfare grounds, of the assumed infrastructure expansion. M
fundamentally, these exercises focus only on the growth benefits of catching u
ignore the costs that it might involve – for example, in terms of public resources that 
could be diverted from other uses in order to support e
ment. As we shall see below, such costs are quite significant, and hence these 
illustrative exercises have to be viewed with caution. 
To save space, we report the results of each scenario organizing Africa’s low-
income countries (LICs) by geographic subregion: West Africa (ECOWAS), East Afric
(EAC), Southern Africa (SADC), and a residual gr
er hand, we group together the three upper-middle-income countries (UMCs) in 
the sample (Botswana, Gabon and South Africa). 
Consider the first scenario of reducing in half the gap between Africa’s leve
infrastructure development and the average in the comparable income category. Figur
shows that Central African LICs would gain, on average, 2.2 percentage points of 
growth—roughly equally attributable to the increased infrastructure quantity and the 
improved quality of infrastructure services (1.16 and 1.06 percent, respectively). Lo
income countries in East and West Africa also would raise their growth by 1.6 perc
points, and those in South Africa by just over 1 percent—with most of the increase 
 
23 The country composition of these sub-regions is as follows: West Africa (ECOWAS) comprises Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo, East Africa (EAC) 
comprises Burundi, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda; Southern Africa (SADC) includes Angola, 
Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and 
Central Africa consists of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Ethiopia 
and Sudan. 
  26increase for upper-middle income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would also reach 
around 1.6 percent per annum, but the bulk of the increase would be due to improvements 
country in 
tal). 
nd the increase would be fully attributable to higher quality of infrastructure 
f 
ch 
e in the 
f 
ries most of the effect would be due to the 
improv
 
in the quality of infrastructure services. 
  The second scenario assumes catch-up with the rate of change, rather than the 
level, of infrastructure development – in each African country, infrastructure growth (in 
quality and quantity) would have proceeded at the same pace as in the average 
the comparable income group outside Africa. In other words, Africa’s level of 
infrastructure development is assumed to keep up (rather than catch up) with that of the 
relevant benchmark group. The bottom half of Figure 4 shows that in this scenario West 
Africa LICs reap the biggest gain: their growth would rise by 1.7 percent per annum (of 
which most would come from faster growth in infrastructure quality, 1.3 percent). At the 
other end, growth increases in East Africa LICs and Central Africa LICs are just below 1 
percent per annum (and quality improvements would account for two-thirds of this to
Finally, the growth rate of upper-middle income African countries would rise by 1.2 
percent, a
services. 
  We can use these counterfactual scenarios to illustrate also the equity potential o
infrastructure development. This is shown in Figure 5. The top half of the figure shows 
that the biggest redistributive payoffs under the first scenario (catch-up) are attained by 
Central Africa LICs, with a reduction in the Gini coefficient by 4.7 basis points, of whi
over half (0.026) is attributable to enlarged infrastructure stocks. At the other end, the 
equity gain among South Africa LICs would be much more modest -- a declin
Gini coefficient by 0.026, again mostly attributable to faster accumulation of 
infrastructure assets (0.017). In turn, East- and West Africa LICs, as well as upper-
middle-income African countries, would achieve a decline in the Gini coefficient of just 
over 0.03. In low-income countries this would be mainly due to the expanded quantity o
infrastructure, while in middle-income count
ed quality of infrastructure services. 
Finally, the bottom half of Figure 5 shows the change in the Gini coefficient that 
would have occurred if infrastructure development in each African country had kept up
with the average outside Africa. In this case, West Africa LICs and South Africa LICs 
  27reap the largest reductions in income inequality, with declines in the Gini coefficien
0.034 and 0.031, respectively. For the latter group, the inequality decline is almost 
equally attributable to larger infrastructure stocks and higher quality, while for the fo
it is mainly due to the improved quality of infrastructure services. In turn, the upper-
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services. 
  So far we have focused on the benefits of infrastructure development – 
about the costs? The faster pace of infrastructure development assumed in the 
counterfactual scenarios must surely involve extra costs too. Higher investment would 
needed to acquire the additional infrastructure assets, and higher current expenditures 
would likewise be necessary to operate and maintain them. Assessing the magnitude of 
these extra expenditures is not an easy task, owing to the very limited availability of data 
on investment and, especially, O&M costs of infrastructure, as well as their unavoidable 
heterogeneity across countries. However, an illustration of the required investment can b
provided using the unit capital costs reported by Yepes et al (2008) to compute a r
estimate of t
expansion. 
  For brevity, we focus on the first counterfactual scenario described above. It is 
important to stress that the lack of suitable data forces us to restrict our attention to th
costs of acquiring additional infrastructure assets (roads, power generation capacity, 
telephone lines), ignoring the costs of maintaining them, a
their quality as assumed in the counterfactual simulation. 
  Figure 6 reports the results of these calculations, expressed as percentage of 
GDP.
24 The figure shows that the infrastructure investment effort implicit in the ca
scenario is quite considerable – as much as 15 percent of GDP in the low-income 
countries of East and Central Africa. The effort is more modest, but still substantia
among Southern Africa’s low-income countries, as well as upper middle-income 
economies, where it ranges between 7 and 8 percent of GDP. Although international data 
 
24 Since the simulation assumes that Africa possesses larger infrastructure assets in 2001-2005, to take 
account of time-to-build the costs are expressed as percentage of average GDP over 1996-2000, assuming it 
takes five years for the assets to become available.  
  28on infrastructure investment are quite scarce, the available information suggests that thes
numbers exceed by a wide margin those observed across the developi
e 










dogeneity of infrastructure 
 
 
                                                
e exception of some rapidly-growing East Asian countries.
25  
Furthermore, given the fairly limited involvement of the private sector in 
infrastructure across the region (with South Africa as the main exception) one can 
conjecture that the bulk of this additional spending would correspond to the public sector
for which it would pose a heavy burden indeed. In fact, in a number of countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa total government revenue is well below 20 percent of GDP. This means 
that in those countries a fast-pace infrastructure catch-up would be financially
and this even ignoring its associated O&M costs. Instead, the acceleration of 
infrastructure development would have to be spread over a number of years. Most 
importantly, its benefits would have to be compared with those of other 
o
 
4  Concluding remarks 
  Poor infrastructure is commonly viewed as one of the key obstacles to econ
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper we have provided an empirical 
evaluation of the potential contribution of improved infrastructure to growth and equity in 
the region. Our assessment is based on the estimation of infrastructure-augmented grow
and income inequality regressions using a large data set comprising 100 countries over 
the period 1960-2005. The empirical approach encompasses different core infrastructur
sectors, considers both the quantity and quality of infrastructure services, and employs 
instrumental variable techniques to account for the potential en
and non-infrastructure determinants of growth and inequality. 
  We find robust evidence that infrastructure development – as measured by an
increased volume of infrastructure stocks and an improved quality of infrastructure 
services – has a positive impact on long-run growth and a negative impact on income 
inequality. The evidence also suggests that these impacts are not different in Sub-Saharan 
Africa vis-à-vis other regions. A variety of specification tests and robustness checks lend
support to our empirical experiments. Since most African countries are lagging in terms 
 
25 See Calderón, Odawara and Servén (2008). 
  29of infrastructure quantity, quality, and universality of access, the tentative conclusion is 












nt infrastructure performance, which 
shows considerable cross-country variation.   
 
 
haran Africa: it is associated with both higher growth and lower inequality. 
Illustrative exercises show that our results are significant not only statistically, b
also economically. Simple decompositions of observed growth and inequality changes 
suggest that over the last fifteen years infrastructure development made a contribution to
growth and equity in virtually all world regions. Outside Africa, such contribution
particularly large in East and South Asia, and smallest in Western Europe, where 
infrastructure was already highly developed by the early 1990s. Infrastructure also helpe
in Sub-Saharan Africa, but to a much more modest extent than in Asia, and the primary 
reason seems to be the region’s lack of progress on the quality of infrastructure services 
over the sample period.  Finally, counterfactual simulations also illustrate the substantial 
gains in terms of growth and equity that most Sub-Saharan African countries could reap 
if their levels of infrastructure develop
f comparator country groups. 
Speeding up infrastructure development also entails costs, however. Illustrative 
calculations show that just cutting in half the infrastructure quantity gap between African
countries and those of comparable income levels in other regions could require as 
as 15 percent of GDP in additional investment, plus potentially large (but hard to 
quantify) amounts in additional O&M expenditures – with most of the burden likely 
falling on the public sector. Barring a massive increase in aid flows, the sheer magnitude
of these figures likely places a fast infrastructure catch-up beyond the financial reach of 
most African countries. Even a more gradual approach to infrastructure catch-up would 
pose considerable demands on fiscal resources over several years, competing with other 
pressing expenditure needs – such as education and health. In the end, the relative p
of infrastructure is likely to vary greatly across the region, depending on a host of 
country-specific factors – including their curre
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  35Table 1
Panel correlations over the period 1960-2005 (5-year non-overlapping observations)
1.1 Synthetic quantity index
Synthetic Quantity Index
Indicator [IK1] [IK2]
Total telephone lines (main lines and mobile phones) 0.935 ..  
 (per 100 workers) (0.000)          
Main telephone lines ..   0.943
 (per 100 workers) (0.000)       
Electricity generating capacity 0.950 0.956
 (in MW per 1000 workers) (0.000)           (0.000)       
Total road length 0.644 0.644
 (in km. per sq. km. of arable land) (0.000)           (0.000)       
1.2 Synthetic quality index
Indicator [IQ] [IQ2]
Quality of telecommunication services 0.813 ..  
 (based on waiting time for main line installation) (0.000)          
Quality of electricity 0.746 0.839
 (based on technical losses of transmission and distrib.) (0.000)           (0.000)       
Quality of roads 0.754 0.810
 (Share of paved in total roads) (0.000)           (0.000)       
Synthetic infrastructure indices: correlation with 
underlying measures
Synthetic Quality Index
Note: The numbers in parenthesis under the correlation coefficients are the corresponding p-
values. The first synthetic index of infrastructure quantity [IK1] is given by the formula: IK1 = 
0.603*K1 + 0.613*K2 + 0.51 * K3, where K1, K2, and K3 denote the logs of (standardized) 
physical measures of infrastructure in telecommunications (main lines and mobile phones), 
electricity (electricity generating capacity), and roads (total road length). The measures of 
telecommunications and electricity are normalized by working population of the country, while 
roads are normalized by the area of arable land. The second synthetic index of infrastructure 
quantity [IK2] is obtained as follows: IK2 = 0.606*K1A + 0.614*K2 + 0.506 * K3. The 
synthetic index IK2 uses the number of main phone lines per 100 workers (K1A) instead of the 
total number of phone lines (K1).  The first synthetic index of infrastructure quality [IQ1] is 
obtained as follows: IQ1 = 0.608*Q1 + 0.559*Q2 + 0.564 * Q3, where Q1, Q2 and Q3 are 
(standardized) physical measures of quality in telecommunications (waiting time in years for the 
installation of main telephone lines), power (the percentage of transmission and distribution 
losses in the production of electricity) and roads (the share of paved roads in total roads). The 
second synthetic index of infrastructure quality [IQ2] omits Q1 from the set of underlying 
indicators, and is given by IQ2 = 0.7*Q2 +0.71* Q3.
 
  36Table 2
Infrastructure and Economic Development:  Correlation Analysis
Synthetic Infrastructure Index
Economic Gini Infrastructure Quantity Infrastructure Quality
Variables Growth Coefficient [IK1] [IK2] [IQ1] [IQ2]
Infrastructure Quantity (IK1) 0.3397 -0.4667 1.0000
  (synthetic index) (0.000)           (0.000)          
Infrastructure Quantity (IK2) 0.3384 -0.4649 0.9962 1.0000
  (synthetic index) (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)        
Infrastructure Quality (IQ) 0.4213 -0.5613 0.7287 0.7269 1.0000
  (synthetic index) (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)         (0.000)        
Infrastructure Quality (IQ2) 0.348            -0.5681 0.6286 0.6361 0.9328 1.0000
  (synthetic index) (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        
Synthetic Infrastructure Index
Economic Gini Infrastructure Quantity Infrastructure Quality
Variables Growth Coefficient [IK1] [IK2] [IQ1] [IQ2]
Access to Sanitation 0.3553 -0.3763 0.8299 0.8275 0.6418 0.6046
(% population with access to sanitation) (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        
Access to Safe Water 0.4370 -0.3023 0.7442 0.7423 0.6152 0.5317
(% population with access to safe water) (0.000)           (0.003)           (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        
Access to Rural Roads 0.4732 -0.4929 0.7992 0.7957 0.6496 0.5867
(% population with access to rural roads) (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        
Access to Electricity 0.3494 -0.3651 0.6929 0.7122 0.2078 0.1219
(% households with access to electricity) (0.022)           (0.047)           (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.330)         (0.915)        
Note: The numbers in parenthesis below the correlation coefficients represent their corresponding p-values. 
Correlations between growth, infrastructure quantity and infrastructure quality are computed over country averages in the period 1990-2005
Access information is generally not available prior to 2000; hence the correlations of access measures with the other variables refer to averages over 2000-2005.  
  37Table 3
Infrastructure and Economic Growth
Dependent Variable: Growth in GDP per capita (annual average, percent)
Sample: 97 countries, 1960-2005 (non-overlapping 5-year period observations)
GMM-IV System Estimation
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4]
Infrastructure Development (synthetic indexes):
Infrastructure Quantity  (IK1)  1/ 2.6641 ** 2.1927 ** 2.0260 * 1.0609
(1.105)           (0.981)           (1.328)           (1.403)          
IK1 squared ..    ..    -0.0403 ..   
(0.247)          
IK1 * Sub-Saharan Africa ..    ..    ..    0.2897
(1.450)          
Quality of Infrastructure Services (IQ1)  2/ ..    1.9581 ** 1.9373 ** 1.5233 *
(0.549)           (0.598)           (0.800)          
IQ1 squared ..    ..    -0.0265 ..   
(0.298)          
IQ1 * Sub-Saharan Africa ..    ..    ..    1.3582
(1.281)          
Control Variables
Initial Output per capita / per worker -4.3056 ** -6.2404 ** -5.9773 ** -5.2489 **
 (in logs) (1.099)           (1.285)           (1.815)           (1.635)          
Education 1.9914 * 2.7857 ** 2.8253 ** 2.9420 **
 (secondary enrollment, in logs) (1.095)           (1.160)           (1.175)           (1.376)          
Financial Development 0.4856 -0.0147 -0.0231 -0.0489
 (private domestic credit as % of GDP, logs) (0.605)           (0.492)           (0.508)           (0.640)          
Trade Openness 1.2705 1.0965 1.1278 0.9347
 (trade volume as % of GDP, logs) (1.053)           (1.410)           (1.380)           (1.363)          
Lack of Price Stability -0.0990 ** -0.0510 * -0.0511 * -0.0618 **
 (inflation rate) (0.036)           (0.033)           (0.033)           (0.031)          
Government Burden -1.3229 -1.9217 * -2.0330 * -1.2706
 (Government consumption as % GDP, logs) (1.274)           (1.281)           (1.297)           (1.363)          
Institutional Quality 0.4748 -0.3029 -0.2769 0.2056
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs) (2.418)           (1.735)           (1.632)           (2.408)          
Terms of Trade Shocks 0.0197 0.0944 * 0.0991 * 0.0768
 (first differences of log terms of trade) (0.066)           (0.051)           (0.053)           (0.055)          
Observations 582 582 582 582
Specification Tests (p-values)
(a) A-B test for 2nd-order serial correlation (0.360)           (0.482)           (0.484)           (0.481)          
(b) Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (0.241)           (0.275)           (0.211)           (0.190)          
(c) Difference-Sargan tests
     All instruments for levels equation (0.166)           (0.340)           (0.290)           (0.197)          
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Our regression analysis includes an intercept and period-specific dummy variables.
* (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level. Standard errors are computed using the small-sample correction by Windmeijer (2005)
1/ See the notes to Table 1 for the definition of the synthetic indices of infrastructure quantity and quality.  
  38Table 4
Infrastructure and Income Inequality
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (end-of-period, in logs)
Sample: 87 countries, 1960-2005 (non-overlapping 5-year period observations)
Estimation: GMM-IV System Estimation
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4]
Infrastructure Development (synthetic indexes):
Infrastructure Quantity  (IK1)  1/ -0.0828 ** -0.0485 * -0.0489 * -0.0537
(0.034)           (0.026)           (0.029)           (0.045)          
IK1 squared ..    ..    -0.0120 ..   
(0.010)          
IK1 * Sub-Saharan Africa ..    ..    ..    0.1815
(0.112)          
Quality of Infrastructure Services (IQ1)  2/ ..    -0.0387 ** -0.0274 -0.0312
(0.017)           (0.019)           (0.026)          
IQ1 squared ..    ..    0.0086 ..   
(0.006)          
IQ1 * Sub-Saharan Africa ..    ..    ..    -0.0349
(0.080)          
Control Variables
Income per capita 0.4305 ** 0.2731 * 0.1571 -0.0123
 (Real output per capita, in logs) (0.162)           (0.160)           (0.245)           (0.240)          
Income per capita squared -0.0213 ** -0.0112 -0.0049 0.0058
(0.009)           (0.009)           (0.014)           (0.014)          
Education -0.0031 ** -0.0032 ** -0.0029 ** -0.0034 **
 (secondary enrollment) (0.001)           (0.001)           (0.001)           (0.001)          
Financial Development -0.0178 -0.0079 0.0043 -0.0115
 (private domestic credit as % of GDP, logs) (0.016)           (0.017)           (0.022)           (0.025)          
Lack of Price Stability -0.0116 -0.0103 -0.0058 -0.0106
 (inflation rate) (0.016)           (0.015)           (0.018)           (0.016)          
Trade Openness 0.0365 * 0.0431 * 0.0552 * 0.0485
 (exports and imports as % of GDP, logs) (0.021)           (0.027)           (0.030)           (0.035)          
Observations 476 476 476 476
Specification Tests (p-values)
(a) A-B test for 2nd-order serial correlation (0.314)           (0.347)           (0.320)           (0.551)          
(b) Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (0.821)           (0.681)           (0.758)           (0.602)          
(c) Difference-Sargan tests
     All instruments for levels equation (0.423)           (0.669)           (0.396)           (0.521)          
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Our regression analysis includes an intercept and period-specific dummy variables.
* (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level. Standard errors are computed using the small-sample correction by Windmeijer (2005)
1/ See the notes to Table 1 for the definition of the synthetic indices of infrastructure quantity and quality.  
  39Table A.1 
List of Countries 
 
Industrial countries (23) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean (22) 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela 
 
East Asia and the Pacific (12) 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (18) 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Yugoslavia (Serbia) 
 
Middle East and North Africa (20) 
Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
 
South Asia (5) 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (36) 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
  40Table A.2
Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality (0-100), end of period, and 
expressed in logs
Authors' construction using Deininger and Squire 
(1996), Milanovic (2000) and World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI).
Real Income per capita Ratio of real GDP (in US$ at 2000 prices) to total population, 
beginning of period, and expressed in logs.
Authors' construction using Summers, Heston and Aten 
(2006) 
Economic Growth Log difference of real GDP per capita. Authors' construction using Summers, Heston and Aten 
(2006) 
Education Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to that 
level of education. 
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World Bank's 
WDI
Financial Development Domestic  credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, in 
logs
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) and The World 
Bank's WDI
Trade Openness Exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, in logs. All 
magnitudes expressed in US dollars at 2000 prices.
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World Bank 
(2003).
Lack of price stability CPI inflation rate, in logs.  It is computed as log((1+dp)*100), 
where dp is the inflation rate. This transformation smooths the 
original variable and gives less weight to hyperinflation episodes.
Author’s calculations using data from IFS and the
publications of the Central Bank. The method of
calculations is based on Beck, Demiguc-Kunt and
Government Burden General Government Consumption Expenditure as percentage of 
GDP, average of period, and expressed in logs.
The World Bank's World Development Indicators and
IMF's Government Financial Statistics
Institutional Quality ICRG Political Risk Index (in logs). The index includes the 
following categories: Government Stability, Socio-Economic 
Conditions, Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, External 
Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religion Tensions, Rule 
of Law, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability, 
Bureaucratic Quality
International Country Risk Guide
Terms of Trade Net barter terms of trade index (2000=100) The World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-
ROM
Terms of Trade Changes Log differences of the terms of trade index Authors' construction using WDI
Size of the modern sector Share of non-agricultural activities in total value added (in 
percentages)




(a) Main telephone lines per 1000 workers (in logs). (b) Main 
telephone lines and mobile phones per 1000 workers (in logs).
Authors' construction using Canning (1999) and 
International Telecommunication Union's World 
Telecommunication Report
Quality of Telecommunication 
Services
Waiting time for main telephone line installation. The variable was 
rescaled such that it takes values between 0 and 1, with higher 
numbers implying higher quality of telecommunication services.
International Telecommunication Union's World 
Telecommunication Report and the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators
Infrastructure Stock of the Electricity 
Sector
Electricity Generating Capacity (in MW per 1000 workers). The 
variable was expressed in logs.
Authors' construction using Canning (1999), United 
Nation's Energy Statistical Yearbook, and national 
sources where available.
Quality of Electricity Services Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (as 
percentage of electricity output). The variable was rescaled such 
that it takes values between 0 and 1, with higher numbers 
implying higher quality of telecommunication services.
The World Bank's World Development Indicators and 
national sources where available.
Road Network (a) Length of total road network, and (b) Length of paved road 
network. Both variables are measured in kilometers per sq. km. of 
surface area of the country, and then expressed in logs
International Road Federation's World Road Statistics, 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators, and 
national sources where available.
Quality of the Road Network Share of paved roads in the overal road network. This variables 
takes values between 0 and 1, with higher numbers implying 
higher quality of the road network.
International Road Federation's World Road Statistics, 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators, and 
national sources where available.
Synthetic Index of Infrastructure 
Quantity
First principal component of the three different dimensions of 
infrastructure considered in our analysis: telecommunications, 
electricity and roads. IK1 comprises information on main lines, 
EGC, and total roads; IK2 on main lines, EGC and paved roads. 
On the other hand, IK3 uses main lines and mobile phones, EGC 
and total roads, while IK4 uses main lines and mobile phones, 
EGC and  paved roads
Author's calculations.
Synthetic Index of Infrastructure 
Quality
First principal component of the three different dimensions of 
infrastructure quality considered in our analysis: 
telecommunications, electricity and roads. The synthetic index 
considered transformations of waiting time for main line 
installation, electricity transmission and distribution losses, and 
share of paved roads.
Author's calculations.
Period-specific Shifts Time dummy variables. Authors’ construction.  
  41Figure 1 
A. Synthetic index of infrastructure quantity 
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B. Synthetic index of infrastructure quality 
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  42Figure 2 
Growth changes across regions due to infrastructure development 
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Figure 3 
Changes in inequality across regions due to infrastructure development 
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  43Figure 4 
Growth change under alternative infrastructure development scenarios 
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  44Figure 5 
Inequality change under alternative infrastructure development scenarios 
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  45Figure 6 
Cost of infrastructure catch-up 
 





























  46Appendix 
 
Trends in infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last quarter century 
 
This appendix offers an overview of trends in infrastructure performance in Sub-
Saharan Africa since 1980. We focus on core infrastructure – roads, electricity, 
telecommunications – which is most directly relevant for growth. However, we shall also 
make reference to water and sanitation, which are widely perceived as critical from the 
point of view of poverty reduction.  
To avoid potential distortions introduced by very small economies, in which 
infrastructure poses some special issues – owing for example to indivisibilities -- we limit 
our coverage to countries with total population over one million. This leaves us with up 
to 42 Sub-Saharan countries with available infrastructure data. To keep information 
manageable, we organize them into four subregions: West Africa (ECOWAS), East 
Africa (EAC), Southern Africa (SADC) and a residual group that we shall label Central 
Africa.
26 It is important to keep in mind, however, that each of these groups is still quite 
heterogeneous, comprising countries of different sizes and income levels. Most notably, 
the SADC group includes very small economies, such as Swaziland and Lesotho, along 
with big South Africa, which by itself represents 40 percent of the entire region’s GDP. 
Likewise, the group combines upper-middle income South Africa and Botswana with 
low-income Malawi and Madagascar. Hence the summary statistics reported below for 
this group have to be interpreted with caution. 
Throughout we use a comparative perspective, placing Africa against the 
background of other world regions. Given the preponderance of low-income countries 
across Africa, the best comparator region is probably South Asia (likewise dominated by 
low-income economies). For the same reason, we also use the group of non-African low-
income economies as another comparator. For illustration, we also look at the 
infrastructure performance of the East Asian tigers (which could be appropriate 
comparators for Africa’s upper middle income economies), along with that of industrial 
countries. 
Finally, since our focus here is on infrastructure performance rather than its 
determinants, we do not attempt to develop a full benchmarking exercise to “explain” 
such divergences on the basis of endogenous and exogenous economic variables – e.g., 
demographic characteristics and per capita income levels.
27 
Figure A.1 offers a comparative perspective on telephone density. We use total 
phones per worker, rather than fixed lines, due to the increasing importance of mobile 
phones. Figure A.1a compares the median values in Sub-Saharan Africa and the other 
                                                 
26 The country composition of these subregions is as follows: West Africa (ECOWAS) comprises Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Tog;, East Africa (EAC) comprises Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda; Southern Africa (SADC) includes Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
and Central Africa consists of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, 
Rep., Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. 
27 Such exercises are performed by Yepes, Pierce and Foster (2008) for Sub-Saharan Africa, Bogetic and 
Fedderke (2006) for South Africa, and Calderón and Servén (2004a) for Latin America. 
  47country groups just listed. Figure A.1b in turn offers a perspective on the performance of 
the different groups of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa defined earlier. 
  It is apparent from Figure A.1a that telephone density in Sub-Saharan Africa lags 
far behind industrial countries and the high-performing economies of East Asia. Since 
1980, Africa has fallen behind the group of (non-African) low-income countries and 
South Asia too in that respect. Figure A.1b shows that there is a lot of heterogeneity 
across country groups, with phone line density in SADC more than three times as high as 
in Central Africa in 2004. Over the last quarter century, West Africa has almost caught 
up with SADC. Inspection of country-level data (not shown to save space) reveals a stark 
contrast between the richer African countries (South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana), all 
close to or beyond the 1,000-line mark, and Ethiopia, Niger and Burundi, still far below 
the 100-line mark. 
  Figure A.2 turns to power generation capacity. There is clear evidence that since 
1980 Africa has fallen far behind South Asia and low-income economies, not to mention 
the richer countries. Since 1980, power generation capacity per worker has remained 
virtually unchanged in Sub-Saharan Africa, while it has more than tripled in low-income 
countries and South Asia. Figure A.2b shows that the only subregion in Africa to witness 
a significant change in power generation capacity per worker has been SADC, where in 
fact the indicator shows a decline. This conceals a substantial expansion of generation 
capacity per worker in South Africa (the leading country in Africa) and Mauritius, along 
with major declines in Zambia and Namibia. 
  Figure A.3 shows the trends in transport networks, as measured by total road 
length relative to arable land surface. In this dimension too there has been little change in 
Sub-Saharan Africa over the last 25 years, while by this measure road networks have 
expanded considerably in the other regions shown. Southern Africa is the only subregion 
showing some progress on this front; in all other African country groups road density has, 
if anything, declined.  
  So far we have focused on the quantity of infrastructure. But the quality of 
infrastructure assets and services is also quite important. However, information on quality 
is much more limited. There are two kinds of information on the quality of infrastructure: 
official statistical data on quantitative quality indicators, and survey-based information on 
the perceptions – often qualitative -- of experts or end-users regarding the performance of 
infrastructure services.  
In the case of telecommunications, data on the indicator that a priori should be 
most informative – the frequency of phone faults – is so sparse as to make the indicator 
useless to capture broad trends. Instead we opt for showing data on waiting times for 
installation of main lines, which show a significantly positive correlation with the phone 
faults indicator over the reduced sample for which the latter is available (Calderón and 
Servén 2008). Even these data offer limited coverage, however – only 22 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa possess the requisite information. With this caveat, Figure A.4a 
shows that waiting times have declined sharply outside Africa, and have dropped all the 
way to zero in industrial countries and East Asia. In Africa, however, the decline has 
been very modest, and in 2000-2004 the median waiting time of the countries for which 
information is available was still around three months. Figure A.4b reveals contrasting 
trends across Africa: wait times halved in East Africa, but doubled in Central Africa. 
SADC also experienced a sharp improvement, and wait times in South Africa, 
  48Madagascar and Mauritius fell close to zero. Across the region, some countries saw 
major progress (notably Mauritius and Tanzania), while others experienced major 
setbacks (especially Sudan). 
The percentage of power transmission and distribution losses relative to total 
output offers a rough measure of the efficiency of the power sector – although it 
combines technical losses, reflective of the quality of the power grid, with pilferage (i.e., 
power theft). The available information (which again offers limited coverage) reveals 
little progress in Africa over the last 25 years. Power losses actually rose in Africa as well 
as low-income countries, in contrast with the improvement observed in other regions 
(Figure A.5a). Within Africa, only SADC showed some progress on this front (Figure 
A.5b). Only three countries (Zaire, Zambia, South Africa) show losses of 6 percent of 
less of total output, comparable to those of rich countries. In Congo, Togo and Nigeria, 
the figure exceeded 30 percent in 2004. 
The main quality indicator widely available for transport is the percentage of 
paved roads in the total road network. Figure A.6a shows that, in spite of modest progress 
over the last 25 years, Africa lags far behind other world regions along this dimension. 
Figure A.6b shows that paved roads are a small fraction of the total in virtually all 
subregions of Africa, with Southern Africa placing first and East Africa last. 
Given the paucity of statistical information on infrastructure quality, we turn to 
survey-based information. One source of such information is provided by the surveys of 
experts compiled for the World Competitiveness Report. Rather than quality alone, they 
tend to combine perceptions on both the quality of infrastructure services and their 
availability. Coverage of these data is also incomplete, and in particular their time series 
dimension is very limited. Hence we show data only for the latest year available (2006). 
Figure A.7 summarizes perceptions regarding the overall quality of infrastructure. 
Higher bars denote higher quality, within a range from 1 to 7. Sub-Saharan Africa ranks 
last of all regions shown (Figure A.7a). Differences across subregions of Africa are 
relatively modest. East Africa is perceived as having the best infrastructure, while the 
worst is that of Central Africa (Figure A.7b). 
Figures A.8 to A.10 respectively depict quality perceptions regarding telephones, 
power and roads. In all three cases Sub-Saharan Africa, along with the group of low-
income countries, lags behind all other regions shown. Central Africa is perceived as 
having the worst quality in transport and telecommunications, while for power East 
Africa places last. In turn, SADC ranks at the top in terms of the perceived quality of 
roads and power. For telephones, the leader instead is ECOWAS, although the 
differences across subregions appear fairly modest. 
A second source of information on infrastructure quality perceptions is provided 
by the World Bank’s firm-level surveys (formerly known as Investment Climate 
Surveys), which at present cover some 70,000 firms in over 100 developing countries. 
For most countries, only one survey is available at present. The graphs below depict the 
regional medians of country averages of the firm-specific responses. 
Figure A.11 reports the delays experienced by firms in acquiring a telephone 
connection. The median delay among the African countries with data is over 20 days, 
somewhat above that of South Asian countries, and three times as high as those reported 
in low-income economies and East Asia (Figure A.11a). Delays are particularly high in 
Central Africa (Fig. A.11b). 
  49Figures A.12 and A.13 refer to power outages – their frequency and their cost in 
terms of lost sales. Outages are less frequent (or have shorter duration) in Africa than in 
South Asia, although in both regions they are much more frequent than in East Asia’s 
high performing economies. However, the cost in terms of sales lost is similar in Africa 
and South Asia – about 2 percent of total sales. Within Africa, the number of days 
without power is especially high in Central Africa, while the cost is highest in East Africa 
– equivalent to a whopping 5 percent of sales. 
Up to this point we have been concerned with the overall quantity and quality of 
infrastructure. But from the point of view of equality of opportunity and poverty 
reduction, another important dimension is the universality of access to infrastructure 
services – i.e., the extent to which existing infrastructure assets yield services to the broad 
population rather than just a few. One way to measure this phenomenon is through access 
rates. Below we offer a comparative perspective on standard indicators of access to 
electricity, roads, water and sanitation. Coverage of information on access rates is 
limited, especially in the time series dimension (except for water and sanitation 
indicators), and therefore we confine ourselves to the cross-country dimension. 
Figure A.14 reports the percentage of the population with access to electricity. 
The indicator is available only for developing countries.
28 Sub-Saharan Africa shows 
very low access rates – the regional median in 2005 was below 20 percent, less than half 
the level of South Asia and non-Africa low-income countries, not to mention the near 100 
percent access rate of East Asia. Across subregions, only West Africa shows a median 
access rate above 20 percent. Among individual countries, only two African countries 
(Mauritius and South Africa) report access rates above 50 percent, while five countries 
(Zaire, Mozambique, Burkina Fasso, Malawi and Uganda) report access rates below 10 
percent. 
A widely-used indicator of access to transport is given by the percentage of the 
rural population living within a short distance (2 km) of an all-season passable road.
29 
Figure A.15a shows that Sub-Saharan Africa trails South Asia and other low-income 
economies along this dimension. Central Africa is the lowest-performing subregion, with 
access to transport just above 20 percent. Only a dozen countries in Africa show access 
rates above 50 percent (the South Asian norm). Botswana and Mauritius are the regional 
leaders, with access rates in excess of 70 percent. 
Figures A.16 and A.17 report access to safe water and sanitation, respectively. 
Africa trails the low-income country group in both dimensions, although in the case of 
sanitation access it is almost on par with South Asia. Mauritius is the regional leader in 
both dimensions, with access rates at or close to 100 percent.  
We should note that access is not distributed evenly across the population. 
Households in the upper percentiles of the income distribution typically enjoy much 
better access than poorer households do (World Bank 2006), and Africa is no exception 
to this rule (Diallo and Wodon 2004; Estache 2005). Nevertheless, expanding service 
coverage is typically associated with improved access by the poor. More broadly, across 
countries higher overall access rates are robustly associated with lower income 
                                                 
28 We use the access indicator reported by the IEA in the World Energy Outlook, which has broader 
coverage that an alternative indicator of household access developed by the World Bank that covers only 
IDA borrowing countries. However, the two indicators show a very high (.89) cross-country correlation. 
29 See Desmarchelier (2005). 
  50inequality. Indeed, the correlation coefficient
30 between access rates and the Gini index 
of income inequality is -.20 in the case of electricity, -.40 for roads, -.33 for sanitation 
and -.30 for water, significantly different from zero in all cases except for power, where
the number of available observations (just 30) is too small to allow conclusive inferences.
In turn, access rates are strongly associated with the quantity of infrastructure available. 
For example, the cross-country correlation between rates of access to electricity and 
power generation capacity per worker is .55, while that between rural road access and the
total length of the road network is .47. Both are significantly different from zero at 































SSA (41) Low income (8) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (17)
Figure A.1a Total Telephone Lines, by Group

















SSA (41) CAC (7) EAC (4) ECOWAS (16) SADC (12)
Figure A.1b Total Telephone Lines, Medians by Sub-Region of Africa 













SSA (42) Low income (8) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (17)
Figure A.2a Electricity Generating Capacity, Medians by Group















SSA (42) CAC (7) EAC (4) ECOWAS (17) SADC (12)
Figure A.2b Electricity Generating Capacity, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa 












SSA (42) Low income (8) SA (5) EAP7 (5) IND (17)
Figure A.3a Total Road Length, Medians by Group 

















SSA (42) CAC (7) EAC (4) ECOWAS (17) SADC (12)
Figure A.3b Total Road Length, Medians by Sub-Region of Africa











SSA (22) Low income (7) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (18)
Figure A.4a Telephone Mainlines, Waiting Time, Medians by Group
(years)














SSA (22) CAC (3) EAC (3) ECOWAS (8) SADC (8)
Figure A.4b Telephone Mainlines, Waiting Time, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa
(years)









SSA (21) Low income (8) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (17)
Figure A.5a Power Losses, Medians by Group












SSA (21) CAC (4) EAC (3) ECOWAS (6) SADC (6)
Figure A.5b Power Losses, Medians by Sub-Region of Africa














SSA (42) Low income (8) SA (5) EAP7 (5) IND (17)
Figure A.6a Paved Road Length, Medians by Group 

















SSA (42) CAC (7) EAC (4) ECOWAS (17) SADC (12)
Figure A.6b Paved Road Length, Medians by Sub-Region of Africa











SSA (24) Low income (9) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (23)
Figure A.7a Overall Infrastructure Quality, Medians by Group
(2006)
Question: The quality of the infrastructure is among the best in the world (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree).











SSA (24) CAC (3) EAC (4) ECOWAS (6) SADC (11)
Figure A.7b Overall Infrastructure Quality, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa (2006)
Question: The quality of the infrastructure is among the best in the world (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree).










SSA (24) Low income (9) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (23)
Figure A.8a Reliability of Telephones, Medians by Group
(2006)
Question: Telephone lines have ample capacity and are highly  reliable (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree).















SSA (24) CAC (3) EAC (4) ECOWAS (6) SADC (11)
Figure A.8b Reliability of Telephones, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa (2006)
Question: Telephone lines have ample capacity and are highly  reliable (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree).











SSA (24) Low income (9) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (23)
Figure A.9a Quality of Power Supply, Medians by Group
(2006)
Question: Your country has sufficient power generation capacity (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree). 












SSA (24) CAC (3) EAC (4) ECOWAS (6) SADC (11)
Figure A.9b Quality of Power Supply, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa (2006)
Question: Your country has sufficient power generation capacity (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree). 









SSA (24) Low income (9) SA (5) EAP7 (7) IND (23)
Figure A.10a Road Infrastructure Quality, Medians by Group
(2006)
Question: Roads are extensive and well maintained (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree). 












SSA (24) CAC (3) EAC (4) ECOWAS (6) SADC (11)
Figure A.10b Road Infrastructure Quality, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa (2006)
Question: Roads are extensive and well maintained (1=strongly disagree; 7 =strongly agree). 













SSA (30) Low income (5) SA (4) EAP7 (4)
Figure A.11a Actual Delay to Obtain Telephone Connection, 
Medians by Group (No. of days, latest years)













SSA (30) CAC (4) EAC (5) ECOWAS (10) SADC (11)
Figure A.11b Actual Delay to Obtain Telephone Connection, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa (No. of days, latest years)











SSA (30) Low income (10) SA (5) EAP7 (4)
Figure A.12a Power Outages, Medians by Group 
(No. of days, latest years)











SSA (30) CAC (4) EAC (5) ECOWAS (10) SADC (11)
Figure A.12b Power Outages, Medians by Sub-Region of Africa
(No. of days, latest years)













SSA (30) Low income (8) SA (3) EAP7 (3)
Figure A.13a Sales Lost due to Power Outages, Medians by Group
(percentage of total sales, latest years)















SSA (30) CAC (4) EAC (5) ECOWAS (10) SADC (11)
Figure A.13b Sales Lost due to Power Outages, 
Medians by Sub-Region of Africa 
(percentage of total sales, latest years)













SSA (28) Low income (13) SA (6) EAP7 (6)
Figure A.14a Access to Electricity by Group
(percentage of the population, 2006)













SSA (28) CAC (6) EAC (3) ECOWAS (8) SADC (11)
Figure A.14b Access to Electricity by Sub-Region of Africa
(percentage of the population, 2006)












SSA (38) Low income (16) SA (6) EAP7 (4)
Figure A.15a Access to Transport by Group
(percentage of population who live within 2 km of all-season road) 
(latest years)













SSA (38) CAC (7) EAC (6) ECOWAS (15) SADC (10)
Figure A.15b Access to Transport by Sub-Region of Africa
(percentage of population who live within 2km of all-season road) 
(latest years)














SSA (42) Low income (16) SA (6) EAP7 (5)
Figure A.16a Access to Improved Water Source by Group
(percentage of the population, 2004)













SSA (42) CAC (8) EAC (6) ECOWAS (16) SADC (12)
Figure A.16b Access to Improved Water Source 
by Sub-Region of Africa
(percentage of the population, 2004)













SSA (42) Low income (16) SA (6) EAP7 (4)
Figure A.17a Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities by Group
(percentage of the population, 2004)














SSA (42) CAC (8) EAC (6) ECOWAS (16) SADC (12)
Figure A.17b Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities 
by Sub-Region of SSA
(percentage of the population, 2004)
Source: WDI, The World Bank.   
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